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2.1  Introduction
Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? 
A common worry has been that Davidsonian semantics apparently aims to explain 
meaning, or meanings, in terms of truth, while deflationism holds that the role of 
truth-talk is wholly expressive, never explanatory. But Michael Williams (1999) argues 
that this appearance is deceptive: Davidsonian semantics, contra Davidson himself, 
does not require truth-talk to play an explanatory role. If this is right, an incompati-
bilist must produce alternative grounds for doubt. Accordingly, Claire Horisk (2007) 
would have us shift our attention to the expressive role of ‘true’. She argues that, in 
any event, it disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from com-
bination with Davidsonian semantics:  the deflationary accounts’ characterizations 
of the mechanisms by which they can fulfill their expressive function are incompat-
ible with features Davidsonian semantics requires of them. She argues, in particular, 
that this is so for Quine’s disquotationalism, Horwich’s minimalism, and Brandom’s 
prosententialism.1
In what follows, I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three cases. 
This involves clarifying Quine’s understanding of a purely referential occurrence; 
explaining how Davidsonians can avail themselves of a syntactic treatment of lexi-
cal ambiguity; and correcting a common misreading of Brandom (answering along 
1 Bar-On et al. (2000) raise the standard worry. Their note 3 supplies references to others. Kölbel (2001) 
also replies that truth plays no explanatory role in Davidsonian semantics. For their various versions of 
deflationism, see, e.g., Quine (1970), Horwich (1998a), and Brandom (1994). Davidson (1984) contains his 
seminal papers on semantics. Davidson’s animadversions on deflationism can be found, e.g., in his (1997, 
2000, 2005).
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the way an objection of Künne (2003) as well). Horisk’s piece is of interest in part for 
the spotlight it shines on these various matters. It is also of interest for a further rea-
son. Although its specific arguments do not succeed, Horisk’s paper invites us to con-
sider a more general question concerning what it would be to combine Davidsonian 
semantics with this or that deflationary conception of truth. I conclude with some 
discussion of that.
2.2  Background
I will assume familiarity with both Davidsonian semantics and deflationary approaches 
to truth. But a brief reminder of the basic ideas will be useful.
Davidson aims to illuminate the concept, or phenomenon, of meaning by asking 
(i) what knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech 
of another, and (ii) what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illu-
minated could in principle ground such knowledge. He answers: knowledge of an 
appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language grounded in what sentences the 
speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. A truth-theory allows the 
derivation, from finite axioms, of theorems of the form ‘S is true in L iff p’ (modulo 
context-sensitivity—see Section 2.3) for all sentences of the target language L, where 
‘p’ is replaced by a sentence that can be said to interpret the target sentence structurally 
described by ‘S’. A Davidsonian ‘radical interpreter’ confirms such a theory in applica-
tion to some speaker if, while thus interpreting the speaker’s sentences, she can also 
attribute to the speaker attitudes that, given what sentences the speaker holds or pre-
fers true in what circumstances, plausibly optimize her rationality and possession of 
true beliefs.2
There are various versions of deflationism and various attempts to characterize 
what they have in common (e.g. Stoljar and Damnjanovic 2010; Armour-Garb & Beall 
2005; Bar-On and Simmons 2006; Burgess and Burgess 2011). Williams’ characteriza-
tion, which Horisk deploys as well, will serve our purpose. On this view, deflationists 
maintain that the function of truth-talk is wholly expressive, never explanatory. Its 
expressive role is to enable us to endorse or reject indirectly what we cannot endorse or 
reject directly—for example, because we don’t know what was said (‘What Joan said, 
whatever it was, is true—I trust her’), or because the relevant claims are too numerous 
(‘every claim of the form “P or not P” is true’). But this exhausts its function. In particu-
lar, truth is not a ‘substantive’ property in the sense of one that plays any explanatory 
role (though of course ‘true’ may appear in explanations in its expressive capacity). 
Versions of deflationism—Williams mentions Quine’s disquotationalism, Horwich’s 
2 While my discussion, following Williams and Horisk, focuses on Davidsonians who accept both of these 
answers, I remark in what follows that my main points apply just as much with regard to neo-Davidsonians 
who reject Davidson’s restriction of the semantically relevant evidence to what’s available to a radical 
interpreter.
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minimalism, and Brandom’s prosententialism—then differ in their accounts of the 
mechanisms by which truth-talk fulfills this function. We turn to these differences in 
Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
Davidson himself, for various reasons, rejected deflationism (1997, 2000, 2005). 
While he shared deflationism’s hostility to traditional attempts to define ‘true’ or 
analyze truth in putatively more basic terms, he concluded only that ‘true’ is inde-
finable and truth unanalyzable, not that it is insubstantial in a way that precludes its 
having an explanatory role. The burden of Williams’s paper is to argue that, in any 
event, nothing in Davidsonian semantics requires truth to play an explanatory role. 
In a truth-theory, the role of truth-talk is not to explain meaning, or meanings, but 
to specify truth-conditions for sentences of a language antecedently unknown to a 
radical interpreter (and thus not available to her for direct endorsement or rejec-
tion). Its role in truth-theories is thus expressive. Truth-talk is likewise expressive 
as used in characterizing the goals of the radical interpreter (thus, as it occurs in 
Davidson’s broader theory of meaning, as opposed to in just the truth-theories that 
the broader theory of meaning deploys). For example, to say that a radical inter-
preter should ceteris paribus optimize possession of true beliefs is to say inter alia 
that ceteris paribus she shouldn’t ascribe the belief that snow is white if snow is not 
white, the belief that there’s a bear next to the tree if there isn’t, that 2 + 2 = 5 if it 
doesn’t, etc.3
Horisk does not challenge Williams on this score. Rather, she argues that the 
expressive role of ‘true’ in Davidsonian semantics itself precludes deflationism, or 
at least extant versions thereof. More specifically, she argues that there are two fea-
tures required for ‘true’ to fulfill its expressive role in a Davidsonian truth-theory. 
First, ‘S is true’ on the left-hand side of a T-theorem must refer to a sentence in L.4 
After all, the point of a truth-theory within Davidsonian semantics, at least in part, 
is to associate truth-conditions with sentences of the target language. How could 
that be accomplished if sentences of the target language were not picked out by 
the T-theorems intended to specify this association? Second, the target sentences 
must be picked out or described by their physical and syntactic properties, not their 
3 Williams does not discuss the role of truth-talk in the statement of the radical interpreter’s 
evidence—specifically, the ascriptions of holding and preferring true. But here we see ‘true’ being used to 
characterize indirectly the endorsements of the subject. The ascriptions are vindicated by the radical inter-
preter’s success, partially on their basis, in ascribing a truth-theory in accord with the canons governing 
radical interpretation. And the truth-theory supplies the ‘empirical information’ (see Section 2.3) required 
to extend our truth-talk to this foreign (or not presumed antecedently understood) tongue.
4 It can sound odd to require that a sentence refer. Frege did indeed thus assimilate sentences to names 
(albeit with sentences referring to truth-values, not to bits of language a la Horisk). But this is not a widely 
embraced aspect of his views. (Dummett (1973: 184) famously labels it a ‘gratuitous blunder’.) It might be 
thought that Horisk must mean that a constituent of the sentence must refer to a sentence of L. But her dis-
cussion of Quine (see Section 2.3) suggests that she does not want this to suffice, assuming a quote-name like 
‘Snow is white’ is a constituent in the relevant sense of ‘ “Snow is white” is true’. Perhaps the feature is best 
read as requiring that a constituent that refers to a sentence in L occur purely referentially, in the Quinean 
sense discussed in what follows.
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semantic properties. For truth-theories are supposed to associate truth-conditions 
with antecedently uninterpreted sentences, ones a radical interpreter does not, or 
cannot, take herself to already understand. Having underscored these features, 
Horisk argues that utilizing Quine’s disquotationalism would violate the first 
requirement, while utilizing Horwich’s minimalism or Brandom’s prosententialism 
would run afoul of the second. The three versions of deflationism Williams men-
tions thus cannot be combined with Davidsonian semantics—nor, she claims, can 
any other extant version.
I now argue that in each case Horisk in fact fails to establish her conclusion.
2.3  Quine’s Disquotationalism
There is some dispute concerning just what Quine’s disquotationalist view is and 
indeed whether he counts as a deflationist (cf. footnote 5). But it suffices to again work 
with Williams’s and Horisk’s conception. According to Williams, Quine’s view has 
it that
the meaning of ‘true’ is fixed by certain logical equivalences. Thus:
‘All that glisters is not gold’ is true if and only if all that glisters is not gold; ‘France is hexago-
nal’ is true if and only if France is hexagonal … and so on.
Appending ‘is true’ to a quoted sentence is just like canceling the quotation marks (‘disquota-
tion’). For this approach, the core use of ‘true’ involves cases where a sentence is referred to by its 
quotation-mark name. But given additional empirical information—for example, that a certain 
sentence expresses Fermat’s Last Theorem—we can easily ascribe truth to sentences picked out 
in other ways. (1999: 546)5
Horisk’s objection to adjoining Quine’s disquotationalism to Davidsonian semantics 
turns on Quine’s elaboration of the disquotational effect of ‘true’. Quotes typically sur-
round sentential contexts that are not ‘purely referential’. A sentential context is purely 
referential if and only if one can substitute salva veritate expressions flanking a true 
identity statement. So, ‘Cicero’ occurs in a purely referential sentential context (so, 
occurs purely referentially) in
Cicero was a Roman senator
because one can substitute salva veritate such co-referential expressions as ‘Tully’—
co-referential, because
Cicero = Tully.
But ‘Cicero’ does not occur purely referentially in
‘Cicero’ begins with the letter ‘c’.
5 Though we may allow Williams some license, Quine officially might jib at talk of fixing meaning.
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In such cases, the truth of the sentence turns on how things are with the referent of the 
quote-name, not on how things are with the referent of the name inside the quotes—i.e. 
in this case, on how things are with ‘Cicero’, not with Cicero. But, although quotes typi-
cally surround sentential contexts that are not purely referential, predication of ‘is true’ 
produces exceptions. In
‘Cicero was a Roman senator’ is true,
‘Cicero’ does occur purely referentially, and the truth of the sentence does depend on 
how things are, or were, with its referent. Indeed,
‘Cicero was a Roman senator’ is true iff Cicero was a Roman senator.
Thus ‘is true’ has the effect of ‘cancellation of linguistic reference’ (Quine 1970: 12). That 
is, it has the effect of canceling reference to terms, rendering relevant instead—so far as 
the sentence’s truth is concerned—the reference of those terms.
Horisk then objects as follows. On Quine’s view, the truth predicate in such sen-
tences cancels linguistic reference, rendering the context purely referential. So, names 
inside quotes to which ‘is true’ is appended function to refer to their usual referents. 
Moreover, it follows from this cancelation that the quote-name does not refer to a 
sentence—nor does anything else (what else would do the trick?). But then, if we con-
join Quine’s disquotationalism with Davidsonian semantics, we must maintain that 
there is no reference to target sentences in T-theorems—which violates the first feature 
required for ‘true’ to fulfill its expressive function in Davidsonian semantics.
But this argument is not sound. Contra Horisk, it does not follow from the fact that 
‘true’ renders the context of ‘Cicero’ purely referential that ‘ “Cicero was a Roman sena-
tor” ’ is not functioning to refer to ‘Cicero was a Roman senator’. For it’s consistent 
with a context within a quote-name’s being purely referential that the context of the 
quote-name itself also be purely referential. Indicated graphically, the struck-through 
context and the underlined context
‘Cicero was a Roman senator’ is true
which differ only in whether they include the quotation marks, might both be purely 
referential. To see this, we need only apply Quine’s test for pure referentiality to the 
context in which the quote-name itself occurs. Can one substitute salva veritate 
co-referential terms for ‘ “Cicero was a Roman senator” ’ in
‘Cicero was a Roman senator’ is true
and thus in
‘Cicero was a Roman senator’ is true iff Cicero was a Roman senator?
Yes, one can. Suppose, for example, we arbitrarily name the sentence ‘Bob’, so that
Bob = ‘Cicero was a Roman senator’.
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Substituting ‘Bob’ in the sentences above to yield
Bob is true
and
Bob is true iff Cicero was a Roman senator
does not alter truth-value. So, the quote-name occurs purely referentially in such sen-
tences. It thus refers to the quoted name. At least, Horisk must agree that it does on 
Quine’s view, since this is the test she deploys in her objection.
What of Quine’s remark that it is precisely the role of ‘true’ to cancel linguistic refer-
ence? How can we reconcile this with the result of applying Quine’s own test—viz. that 
there is after all reference to a linguistic item? There are two main options. First, we might 
grant that Quine commits himself to a contradiction.6 Of course, it’s not advisable for a 
Davidsonian to conjoin an inconsistent view to her own. But equally obviously she can 
just disown this remark of Quine’s, taking only what she needs. At least she can so long 
as treating Quine as a deflationist, or utilizing Quine’s disquotationalism for deflationist 
purposes, does not require embracing the further remark. And it does not: what is cru-
cial for Williams is just that instances of the equivalence schema ‘fix the meaning’ of ‘true’.
The second option is more charitable to Quine. We can take his talk of canceling lin-
guistic reference as simply expressing his acceptance of the equivalence schema. ‘True’ 
doesn’t cancel linguistic reference in the sense of rendering the quote-name’s context 
non-referential; rather, it cancels linguistic reference only in that it has the effect, when 
appended to a sentence’s quote-name, of yielding a sentence equivalent to the sentence 
quoted. There’s then no contradiction. We need only take care not to read Quine’s talk of 
cancelation too flat-footedly (a warning suggested by the passage quoted in footnote 6).
It should be noted that, in fact, typical T-theorems of a Davidsonian truth-theory 
for a natural language will not be instances of a disquotationalist equivalence schema. 
They thus will not be instances of what the disquotationalist considers, in Williams’s 
words, the ‘core use’ of ‘true’ (1999: 546). First, natural language sentences are typi-
cally context-sensitive—tense alone yields this. Straightforward disquotation does not 
guarantee an equivalent sentence in such cases. To ensure equivalence, one must add 
6 Indeed, it seems he not only commits himself to contradictory statements (if we take the ‘cancellation’ 
remark flat-footedly), he makes them—at least if to mention a sentence is to refer to it. Quine writes that:
… the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a 
reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point. (1970: 11)
This is contra Horisk’s remark that:
Generally [on Quine’s treatment], a sentence of the form ‘s is true’ does not mention the sentence s. 
Furthermore, Quine’s treatment gives no reason to suppose that a sentence of the form ‘s is true’ refers 
to s; it does not refer to s by mentioning it, and there is no other obvious mechanism of reference to s. 
(2007: 542)
Perhaps, though, one might distinguish here ‘genuine’ and merely ‘formal’ mentioning a la Price 
(2004: 290, fn. 5).
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the way an objection of Künne (2003) as well). Horisk’s piece is of interest in part for 
the spotlight it shines on these various matters. It is also of interest for a further rea-
son. Although its specific arguments do not succeed, Horisk’s paper invites us to con-
sider a more general question concerning what it would be to combine Davidsonian 
semantics with this or that deflationary conception of truth. I conclude with some 
discussion of that.
2.2  Background
I will assume familiarity with both Davidsonian semantics and deflationary approaches 
to truth. But a brief reminder of the basic ideas will be useful.
Davidson aims to illuminate the concept, or phenomenon, of meaning by asking 
(i) what knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech 
of another, and (ii) what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illu-
minated could in principle ground such knowledge. He answers: knowledge of an 
appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language grounded in what sentences the 
speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. A truth-theory allows the 
derivation, from finite axioms, of theorems of the form ‘S is true in L iff p’ (modulo 
context-sensitivity—see Section 2.3) for all sentences of the target language L, where 
‘p’ is replaced by a sentence that can be said to interpret the target sentence structurally 
described by ‘S’. A Davidsonian ‘radical interpreter’ confirms such a theory in applica-
tion to some speaker if, while thus interpreting the speaker’s sentences, she can also 
attribute to the speaker attitudes that, given what sentences the speaker holds or pre-
fers true in what circumstances, plausibly optimize her rationality and possession of 
true beliefs.2
There are various versions of deflationism and various attempts to characterize 
what they have in common (e.g. Stoljar and Damnjanovic 2010; Armour-Garb & Beall 
2005; Bar-On and Simmons 2006; Burgess and Burgess 2011). Williams’ characteriza-
tion, which Horisk deploys as well, will serve our purpose. On this view, deflationists 
maintain that the function of truth-talk is wholly expressive, never explanatory. Its 
expressive role is to enable us to endorse or reject indirectly what we cannot endorse or 
reject directly—for example, because we don’t know what was said (‘What Joan said, 
whatever it was, is true—I trust her’), or because the relevant claims are too numerous 
(‘every claim of the form “P or not P” is true’). But this exhausts its function. In particu-
lar, truth is not a ‘substantive’ property in the sense of one that plays any explanatory 
role (though of course ‘true’ may appear in explanations in its expressive capacity). 
Versions of deflationism—Williams mentions Quine’s disquotationalism, Horwich’s 
2 While my discussion, following Williams and Horisk, focuses on Davidsonians who accept both of these 
answers, I remark in what follows that my main points apply just as much with regard to neo-Davidsonians 
who reject Davidson’s restriction of the semantically relevant evidence to what’s available to a radical 
interpreter.
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1998a: 100) can be associated with different meanings, as with ‘bank’ (one of Horwich’s 
examples).
Horisk, on this basis, rules minimalist deflationism unsuitable for Davidsonian 
semantics. Treating ambiguity this way—individuating terms semantically—runs 
afoul of the second feature Davidsonian semantics requires of the expressive role of 
‘true’—viz. that target sentences be picked out or described by their physical and syntac-
tic properties, not their semantic properties.
Now, ambiguity is a phenomenon Davidsonian semantics must accommo-
date anyway: if it cannot, it has a serious problem independently of any attempt to 
combine it with deflationism. On the other hand, if it can be accommodated, then 
Horisk’s objection only has bite if the accommodation cannot be combined with 
Horwich’s minimalism. Note that this accommodation needn’t preserve Horwich’s 
own treatment of ambiguity. A Davidsonian who endorses Horwich’s minimalism 
needn’t follow Horwich on every point. Indeed, she cannot, since Horwich devel-
ops his overall position in part by explicitly rejecting Davidsonian semantics.10 I will 
reply to Horisk at first without reference to Horwich’s own view of ambiguity. But 
then I’ll suggest that minimal tinkering can perhaps bring his remarks in line with 
Horisk’s requirements.
A common way to accommodate ambiguity in Davidsonian semantics is to insist 
that T-theories apply to target-language expressions individuated at a grain and in a 
way appropriate to semantics. For example, the orthographic representation ‘Flying 
planes can be dangerous’ is structurally ambiguous. A plausible T-theory will utilize, 
not this orthographic representation, but rather two representations, distinguished by 
different syntactic features. Similarly for lexical ambiguity: a plausible T-theory will 
utilize, not the orthographic representation ‘John is at the bank’, but two representa-
tions, distinguished syntactically by the appearance of distinct lexical items—if you 
will, ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’, to which semantic values are assigned by distinct axioms. (Cf., 
e.g., Gillon 1990 and Larson and Segal 1995.) This requires a sufficiently fine concep-
tion of syntax. Though there is a coarser conception according to which ‘Dogs run’ and 
‘Cats walk’ are syntactically identical, the finer-grained conception relevant to con-
structing plausible T-theories has them differ in virtue of containing different lexical 
items: the rest of their trees are the same, but the labels of their terminal nodes differ.
It is consistent with this syntactic treatment of ambiguity, including lexical ambigu-
ity, to allow that there is a sense in which semantic considerations play a role in the 
justification of the ascription of a T-theory. A radical interpreter presumably incorpo-
rates ambiguity into an ascribed T-theory in this way because doing so appropriately 
optimizes true beliefs and rational behavior. Competitor T-theories that assign ‘bank’ 
a single semantic value via a single axiom would yield less charitable interpretations. In 
10 See, e.g., Horwich (1998a:  132–3, 1998b:  71–4). Williams (2007) discusses his disagreements with 
Horwich.
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this sense, we might say that radical interpreters individuate expressions in part based 
on the semantic consequences of doing so. But this of course involves no antecedent 
knowledge of the target expressions’ semantic properties. Moreover, we are talking 
here of an epistemic sense of ‘individuation’. It concerns what grounds the radical inter-
preter’s individuation. Metaphysical individuation, on the other hand, concerns what 
makes it the case that things are distinct or what distinguishes them—not the basis for 
our distinguishing them.
It might be objected that this distinction between the epistemic and the meta-
physical collapses in the context of Davidson’s broader theory of meaning, since, 
on his view, the semantic facts (up to indeterminacy) are what they are in virtue of a 
radical interpreter’s being able to so interpret the speaker—similarly, let us suppose, 
for these syntactic facts concerning lexical individuation. But though Davidson does 
identify the semantic facts with what radical interpretation can yield, the objection, 
in my opinion, overstates Davidson’s ‘interpretivism’ in suggesting that what makes 
it the case that the semantic facts are as they are is what radical interpretation yields. 
It is consistent with the tight connection Davidson draws to allow, for example, that 
non-semantically characterized (actual and possible) patterns of use determine 
the semantic facts—or even to reject the cogency of this ‘what makes it the case’ 
question.11 In any event, even if words are typed as they are in virtue of the fact that 
a radical interpreter would so type them, it simply doesn’t follow that the expres-
sions mentioned on a T-theorem’s left-hand side are there ‘picked out or described’ 
semantically. That would be so if the left-hand sides’ structural descriptions incor-
porated such descriptions as, say, ‘the word that is satisfied by financial institutions’. 
But they don’t.
To be sure, T-theories that treat ambiguous words as distinct lexical items ipso facto 
treat them as so individuated as to have distinct meanings. That is indeed the whole 
point; it cannot be an objection that they do so. Again, it doesn’t follow that the lexical 
items are not individuated syntactically. The expression types ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’ are 
syntactically distinct, however tokens may be phonologically, orthographically, or oth-
erwise realized (even if some tokens of different types are not physically distinct); and 
they can be ‘picked out’ by this syntactic difference. It is true that ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’ 
arbitrarily designate the types that they do: reversing the labels yields a notational vari-
ant. But, again, it does not follow, at least not obviously, that one can only pick out or 
describe the types semantically, even if the arbitrary convention is itself established 
by reference to semantics. Of course, questions remain concerning what determines 
11 Patterns of use could determine the semantic facts without being identical to them and without the 
converse entailment:  the semantic facts could supervene on use facts without being reducible to them. 
Horwich (1998b: e.g. 5), contra Davidson, maintains that semantic facts can be reduced to use facts. (He 
puts the point in terms of properties. My talk of facts is intended as a place-holder neutral among competing 
metaphysical positions. For what it’s worth, Davidson himself, though he does not admit facts into his ontol-
ogy, likewise indulges in talk of semantic facts.)
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(metaphysically and epistemically) what type a particular token is a token of, but that’s 
another matter.
Horisk does not take up and so of course does not offer any objection to this 
common way of handling ambiguity. Nor is it obvious that there is anything awry 
with a Davidsonian minimalist deflationist availing herself of it. Indeed, it would 
seem that Horwich could avail himself of something like it as well. On Horwich’s 
non-Davidsonian conception of meaning, meaning is determined by a use-regularity, 
what best explains the overall use of the expression-type. For example, his defense of 
minimalism rests in large part on his claim that a disposition to accept instances of the 
propositional equivalence schema best explains the overall use of ‘true’. As for ambigu-
ity, he accommodates it by noting that in such cases the simplest explanation of the 
overall use of a phonological type involves positing subtypes with distinct regularities 
of use (Horwich 1998b: 81). Positing such subtypes is like positing syntactically distinct 
lexical items, in that in both cases one is individuating types at a finer grain, so at a fur-
ther level of abstraction. Thus we may read Horwich’s treatment as not really in conflict 
with Horisk’s required feature after all. For Horwich too can say that he individuates 
lexical items syntactically, not semantically—at least under the appropriate construal 
of syntax. Horwich himself identifies syntactic form with physical character (as quoted 
in this section’s first paragraph and by Horisk as well). But there is a conception of syn-
tax available to him that is not so restricted. Indeed, the phonological types to which 
he adverts are already an abstraction from physical characteristics. Horisk should not 
have any objection to this: her second feature adverts to ‘physical and syntactic prop-
erties’ (2007: 536, 540, 543–4, 547–8, 550, and 556) in a way that strongly suggests that 
she does not consider the latter a subset of the former. Moreover, there is even a way to 
preserve Horwich’s talk of individuation in terms of semantic properties. It might suf-
fice for Horwich’s purposes, when he says that sentence-types must be ‘individuated 
semantically as well as physically’ (1998a: 133), that they be epistemically individuated 
semantically and/or so individuated as to yield distinct types when in fact they have 
distinct meanings.
2.5  Brandom’s Prosententialism
Brandom differs from both Quine and Horwich in maintaining that, despite appear-
ances to the contrary, ‘true’ is not even a predicate. On his view, it is a prosentence-forming 
operator. A prosentence, on Horisk’s explanation, is one:
that inherits its content from an anaphoric antecedent, just as many pronouns inherit their con-
tent from anaphoric antecedents. To illustrate, suppose Ciara says ‘The grass is long’, Katrina 
says ‘It needs to be mown’, and Connor says ‘That is true’. Katrina’s pronoun ‘it’ inherits its con-
tent from its anaphoric antecedent, the noun phrase ‘the grass’. Similarly, Connor’s prosentence 
‘That is true’ inherits its content from its anaphoric antecedent, the sentence ‘It needs to be 
mown’. (2007: 544–5)
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Horisk argues that the second feature required for ‘true’ to play its required expressive 
role in Davidsonian semantics—again, that target sentences be picked out or described 
by their physical and syntactic properties, not their semantic properties—precludes 
adoption of Brandom’s prosententialism. For sentences picked out in the required 
way have their truth-conditions contingently, whereas T-theorems construed in 
Brandomian terms would be necessary. This modal mismatch arises because, in an 
instance of an equivalence schema (say, ‘ “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is 
white’), the anaphoric antecedent of the clause containing the truth-term is of the same 
type as the token on the right-hand side. Since the prosentence inherits its content from 
its antecedent, it is identical in content to it. But then it is identical in content to the 
token on the other side of the biconditional. And a biconditional flanked by synony-
mous clauses is necessary.12
A first reply to Horisk redeploys observations made above. In the case of T-theorems, 
it is not generally true that the token on a T-theorem’s right-hand side is of the same 
type as the structurally described target sentence:  first, because of the deviations 
required to accommodate context-sensitivity; and, second, because the meta-language 
may differ from the object language. Suppose, however, that the target language is in 
fact the radical interpreter’s (though she cannot know this qua radical interpreter) and 
that the target sentence in question is context-insensitive. Even if Horisk’s worry does 
not arise in general for Davidsonian T-theorems, it arguably does in these cases; and 
that suffices to cause trouble.13
The more fundamental reply to Horisk is that her characterization of Brandom’s 
view is based on a common misreading, unfortunately abetted by some of Brandom’s 
own locutions but clearly not what he intends.14 On Brandom’s prosententialism, the 
content of a prosentence is not exhausted by that of its antecedent. So, although it 
12 Horisk addresses at some length, drawing upon Rumfitt (2001), replies that would deny that T-theorems 
are contingent. The basic idea is that, even if languages are individuated semantically, some T-theorems will 
be contingent—viz. those for strictly a priori statements. Strictly a priori statements are those such that any-
one who understands them is, on that account, in a position know them—i.e. those whose truth is entailed 
by an interpretive semantic theory. While the T-theorems for sentences expressing such statements will have 
necessary left-hand sides (since they will be entailed in all worlds by the theory), some such statements (and 
thus the T-theorems’ right-hand sides) will be contingent, rendering the T-theorem as a whole contingent.
I will not discuss this issue here, but rather will show that, even if we grant the premise that T-theorems are 
contingent, we can reply to Horisk’s claim that the expressive role of ‘true’ precludes combining Davidsonian 
semantics and Brandomian prosententialism.
13 In Davidson’s view, what language someone speaks is indeterminate. (Cf., e.g., Davidson, 1979: 239–40, 
1994: 82.) So, talk here of supposing the radical interpreter and the target subject speak the same language 
would have to mean something like: they use phonologically very similar expressions that can be inter-
preted more-or-less homophonically, context-sensitivity aside. I am trying, however, to keep indeterminacy 
in abeyance. In any event, the supposition is to Horisk’s advantage. That said, even if the languages do differ, 
the first reply at best undermines Horisk’s argument that Brandom’s view commits him to the necessity of 
T-theorems (at least in the case of context-insensitive sentences); it does not show that the view is not so 
committed. The next reply does.
14 The misreading is found as well in, for example, Armour-Garb and Beall (2005) and Burgess and 
Burgess (2011).
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inherits content from its antecedent, it’s not the case that all of the prosentence’s con-
tent is thus inherited, as the phrase ‘inherits its content’—not only used by Horisk, 
but unfortunately found in Brandom as well—would suggest.15 If Brandom’s view 
were as Horisk characterizes it, it would be open to objection independently of any 
attempt to combine it with Davidsonian semantics. For suppose John utters ‘It’s rain-
ing’ and Mary utters ‘What that tall guy said is true’. It would seem Brandom would 
have to maintain that the content of Mary’s utterance is simply that it’s raining. And 
this is objectionable because prime facie—and on Brandom’s own views of content 
and inferential status (as we will see in a moment)—it would seem that the utter-
ance’s content contains more, involving being a tall guy and saying. (Cf. Burgess and 
Burgess 2011: 41.) But Brandom is not guilty of the charge. The objection is based on 
a misreading.16
Though Brandom does use the phrase ‘inherit its content’ and says, for example, that 
‘ “Snow is white” is true’ has the ‘same semantic content’ as its antecedent, he immedi-
ately after the last remark adds that:
[t] he prosentence differs from its antecedent in explicitly acknowledging its dependence upon 
an antecedent—as ‘She stopped’ differs from ‘Mary stopped’ when the pronoun has some token 
of the type ‘Mary’ as its antecedent. Otherwise the lazy uses are purely redundant.
(Brandom 1994: 302)17
Their content thus differs precisely in that the contents of such sentences as ‘ “Snow is 
white” is true’, unlike that of ‘Snow is white’, in part concern linguistic tokens. And it’s 
not just that Brandom says this: there is nothing in his view that precludes him from 
doing so.
Moreover, Brandom is well aware of the differing modal profiles of such sentences. 
This is clear from remarks he makes in developing his parallel deflationary account of 
reference:
This account of Tarskian contexts in which ‘refers’ and its cognates appear [according to which 
base clauses are so paraphrased that ‘refers’ occurs only within an anaphorically indirect descrip-
tion] respects the different modal status of
15 The phrase ‘inherits its content’ and close cousins appear five times in Making It Explicit (Brandom 
1994: 304, 305, 327, 493, and 568). Most, perhaps all, can be read as not entailing identity of content. In some 
cases, however, it arguably requires a stretch. For instance, Brandom (1994: 305) writes of ‘treating the whole 
expression “that is true” as a prosentence anaphorically referring to a sentence tokening from which it inher-
its its content’. Here, one would have to read ‘it’ as referring to the expression ‘that is true’ and ‘its’ as referring 
to the antecedent.
16 There are maneuvers available to a view that does maintain identity of content. One might distinguish 
the presuppositional and assertoric content of an utterance, or maintain that an utterance of the sentence 
would effect several distinct assertions. But Brandom needn’t go down any such route, even if his other com-
mitments leave room for them (something that is not altogether clear).
17 In an attached footnote, he even takes the last claim back, foreshadowing aspects of lazy pro-
nouns’ inferential role that become important for him later. (Incidentally, Brandom (personal com-
munication) confirms that his ‘Snow is white is true’ on pp. 302–28 too—is just a typo, pace Künne 
2003: 84.)
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The term ‘Leibniz’ denotes Leibniz,
which is only contingently true, and
Leibniz is Leibniz,
which is necessarily true. For the possibility that the first claim is not true can be understood in 
terms of its paraphrase as the existence of a possible world w such that
The one referred to as ‘Leibniz’ in w is not Leibniz,
that is, is not the one we refer to in our own world as ‘Leibniz’. The explicit relativization of the 
indirect description to a possible world simply specifies which world its antecedent tokens are 
found in. The candidate antecedents of
the one referred to as ‘Leibniz’ in w
are tokenings of the type ‘Leibniz’ that are uttered in w. The anaphoric approach accordingly 
has room for what has been thought of as the contingency of word–world semantic relations, 
although it is not based on such relations.
(Brandom 1994: 318)
Not only do these remarks take up these modal differences, they attempt to illuminate 
them in light of the anaphoric deflationary account. Returning to Brandom’s prosen-
tential theory of ‘true’, the analogous point is that the contingency of
‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,
in contrast to the necessity of
Snow is white iff snow is white,
reflects the fact that, in different possible worlds, the prosentence would anaphorically 
depend on different antecedent tokenings.
If Brandom does not identify the content of a prosentence with that of its ante-
cedent, then Horisk’s objection to combining prosententialism with Davidsonian 
semantics vanishes. There is a worry that persists, however. I have suggested that 
the prosentence contains ‘more’ content than its antecedent. This of course leaves 
in place that it contains at least the antecedent’s content, which can seem objection-
able enough. Thus Künne (2003: 86) invites us to consider someone who has heard of 
Goldbach’s conjecture but knows nothing that would distinguish it from various other 
theorems about prime numbers. Suppose this person reads a headline announcing its 
proof. How, Künne asks, could her claim that Goldbach’s conjecture is true have the 
same content as (or, we can add, have even in common the content of) the claim that 
every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes? This, to be sure, is an 
objection to Brandom’s prosententialism itself, not specifically to combining it with 
Davidsonian semantics; nor need a reply to Horisk rebut it. But taking it up will clarify 
Brandom’s position and our reply to Horisk.
The crucial point here is that one must understand Brandom’s talk of content 
in terms of his larger enterprise. For him, it is a shorthand for more official talk of 
inferential relations of incompatibility, commitment preservation, and entitlement 
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preservation. ‘What the newspaper says is true’ differs in content from ‘Every even 
number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes’ because asserting the former, but not 
the latter, commits one to the existence of a newspaper: it thus contains ‘more’ content. 
But someone who asserts the former does commit herself, given the chain of anteced-
ents, to the latter—and entitles others to it as well—even if, in her ignorance of prime 
number theory, she doesn’t realize this. Her assertion inherits the inferential relations 
of its antecedent; it’s in this sense that it inherits its content. Brandom (2010: 337) says 
he can talk of inferential commitments ‘without committing myself to identifying 
and individuating concepts, or conceptual contents (though sometimes, when it seems 
harmless, I do speak with the vulgar and use such expressions)’. It seems that this is a 
case in which it has not proven harmless.18
It might be suggested that, while this clarifies Brandom’s content-talk, the ques-
tion remains whether anything in Davidson’s views—whatever might be the case with 
Brandom—might require him, were he to adopt prosententialism, to identify the con-
tents of prosentences and their antecedents. So put, this is not yet a developed objec-
tion, but we can point out in any event that at least the two most obvious places one 
might look for support in fact don’t offer any. First, some ascribe to Davidson the view 
that the right-hand side of a T-theorem gives the meaning of the sentence targeted 
on the left-hand side (e.g. Lepore and Ludwig 2005). Might this force a prosenten-
tialist Davidsonian to endorse the synonymy of prosentences and their antecedents? 
Actually, this ascription is disputed (Ebbs 2012). But, even if accepted, it raises no prob-
lem here. One needs to consider the T-theorems for sentences containing ‘true’, which, 
on a prosententialist approach, would presumably assign the sentence a prosentential-
ist structure. Such a T-theorem would perforce be in some manner contextualized. For 
example, it might take the form: for utterances u of sentence-type S, for all contextual 
parameters c1, …, cn, if F(c1, …, cn), then u is true iff G(c1, …, cn). Among the contextual 
parameters would be those that determine which sentence is the prosentence’s ante-
cedent. Such a T-theorem would not render a prosentence-token and its antecedent 
synonymous. (Cf. Gross 2005a on context-sensitivity and meaning-theoretic exten-
sions of Davidsonian truth-theories.) Second, there is Davidson’s (1968) deployment 
of a same-saying relation in dealing with indirect speech. Might he be committed 
to maintaining that prosentences and their antecedents same-say one another? But, 
again, this would raise no problem. Same-saying, for Davidson, amounts to being rel-
evantly similar, where relevance no doubt varies with context. (Cf. Davidson 1999.) 
18 Künne (2003: 86) raises a second objection. Brandom (2002: 106) says that, to understand a sentence 
containing ‘true’, ‘one must process the noun phrase to determine what sentence tokening (or class of such 
tokenings) it picks out as anaphoric antecedent(s)’. Künne objects that this standard needn’t be met, rhe-
torically asking whether one can assert with understanding ‘Hegel’s most notorious remark about truth is 
true, but I have no idea what that remark is’ only by falsifying its second conjunct. But the reply is that 
knowing-what comes in degrees (perhaps ‘know what’ is context-sensitive). The speaker knows what the 
antecedent is, to a degree sufficient for Brandom’s criterion, in knowing that it is Hegel’s most notorious 
remark about truth.
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Davidson can allow the relevant similarity of prosentences and their antecedents—for 
instance, in what other attitudes the speaker who uses them might be, on that account, 
reasonably taken to have—without running afoul of Horisk’s requirements.
2.6  Conclusion
Horisk’s challenge fruitfully forces us to ask whether the details of developed deflation-
ary accounts mesh with the details of Davidsonian semantic theorizing. I have argued 
that, so far as her specific objections go, Davidsonian deflationists remain unscathed. 
But that’s not to say there are no more devils in the details. I have certainly not argued 
that deflationism and Davidsonian semantics are compatible. But, by removing fur-
ther alleged obstacles, I have given further reason to think they may be. I have also 
not argued that deflationist Davidsonian semantics is an attractive position. There 
are of course standard worries for deflationism and for Davidsonian semantics taken 
individually.19 Combining them does not remove the worries. I have argued only that 
combining them has not been shown to add to the worries. Those who find each indi-
vidually attractive—and who think the standard worries can be answered—have rea-
son to avail themselves of the combination.
I conclude by deflecting a question our discussion might suggest, one that can 
seem more general and prior to the specific points we have taken up—viz. just what 
is it to combine this or that deflationist view with Davidson’s? In various places, we 
have noted that of course it cannot mean conjoining everything Quine, or Horwich, 
or Brandom says with what Davidson says. To add to previous instances: Davidson, 
unlike Horwich, eschews propositions as explanatorily otiose; and Brandom, unlike 
Davidson, rejects compositionality. Indeed, might one, on Horisk’s behalf, press this 
as an objection: until we have more clarity on what counts as such a combination, per-
haps we are not in a position to assess—or to endorse—one?
But ‘what counts as such a combination?’ is simply not the important question. The 
important question is whether one can develop a deflationism that meshes with defen-
sible aspects of Davidsonian semantics. Such a development could take this or that 
element from whatever extant view it wished, so long as the result works and receives 
support. Perhaps there’s an argument, for example, that a radical interpreter would 
assign prosentential logical forms to subjects’ target-language uses of truth-talk. If so, 
it just wouldn’t matter whether the position in other respects was Brandomian. We 
began, after all, by taking this attitude toward Davidson’s own views, since he rejects 
deflationism.
Indeed, there are other aspects of Davidson’s views that a neo-Davidsonian deflation-
ist may well wish to drop. For example, cognitivist neo-Davidsonians (e.g. Larson and 
19 In Gross (2001, 2005b, and forthcoming), I discuss in particular worries for truth-conditional seman-
tics arising from pervasive context-sensitivity.
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Segal 1995), who ascribe cognition, or embodiment, of a Davidson-style truth-theory 
as part of the larger psychologized project of empirical linguistics, reject Davidson’s 
restriction of the semantically relevant evidence to what’s available to a radical inter-
preter. (Cf. Gross 2012.) Construing their ascription’s truth-talk in a deflationary way 
would allow such semanticists to deploy a truth-conditional framework without rep-
resentational commitments. As far as I can see, Horisk’s worries do not arise for such 
neo-Davidsonians either.20
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